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There is no shortage of literature on the social movements that arose in East Germany in 1989. 
Numerous studies have shed light upon the nature, scale and dynamics of the uprising of that 
year. But on certain issues questions remain. No consensus exists, for example, on the 
relationship between the ‘civic groups’ (New Forum, Democratic Awakening, etc.) and the 
street protests of the autumn of 1989. Were these simply two facets of a single movement? Or 
are they better characterised as two distinct streams within the same movement delta? Did the 
street protests push the civic movement activists into the limelight? Or is it more accurate to 
say, with Reinfried Musch, that ‘the civic movement brought the people onto the streets’?1 This 
paper considers two contrasting interpretations of these issues, and finds both wanting. An 
alternative interpretation is offered, one that draws upon Marc Steinberg’s ‘dialogical’ 
development of frame theory. 
 
 
Did opposition activists play the role of ‘movement organisers’? 
 
The dominant viewpoint is that civic activists were central to the process of mobilisation in 
1989. They created focal points at which resistance gathered. They ‘brought the people onto the 
streets.’ In Mary Fulbrook’s words, it was the ‘leaven of dissident groups’ which ‘began to 
raise the bread of the largely subordinate masses.’2 The civic groups were, according to 
Karsten Timmer, a ‘mobilising force,’ one that ‘offered many thousands of people the 
opportunity to get involved constructively, and tapping into the ubiquitous sentiment that 
something must be done.’3 
Yet there are many who see the matter otherwise. For Steven Pfaff and Hyojoung Kim, 
the civic groups remained ‘out of step with popular demands’ throughout the protest cycle.4 
Mark Thompson proposes that ‘would-be emigrants started the protests, mass emigration 
ignited further demonstrations, and demands for unification were the culmination of the 
revolution.’5 The ‘real revolutionaries’ of 1989 were not civic movement supporters but ‘exiters, 
would-be exiters, and those who demanded reunification.’6 Perhaps the most prominent critics 
of the ‘dissidents as leaven’ thesis are Karl-Dieter Opp and his colleagues, in Origins of a 
Spontaneous Revolution. In their judgement, organised oppositionists contributed little, if 
anything, to the emergence and mobilisation of the demonstration movement in Leipzig (the 
city at the heart of the rising). Their survey data shows that although members of the civic 
organisations were much more likely to have participated in ‘general protests’ in the early 
autumn than were respondents who belonged to no such group, they were only slightly more 
likely to have taken part in demonstrations.7 Alluding to a ‘well-known snowball effect, in 
which a small number of revolutionaries sparks a mass movement,’ they contend that in 1989 
protest developed quite differently: ‘the few “revolutionaries” in fact remained among 
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themselves’. Far from playing ‘an outstanding role’ they remained ‘marginal’ to events.8 Their 
success in ‘getting others to protest or of providing incentives for protest [was] very minor.’9 
Moreover, civic groups failed to encourage those outside their milieu to become ‘professional 
revolutionaries.’ As Jochen Läβig, a leading member of Leipzig New Forum, recalls: 
 
People came to me and wanted to become members of the New Forum. But I 
could get very few of them to really embark on political work. [They] signed up 
as members and were willing to take part in some evening activities, but nobody 
really wanted to take a personal risk by saying, “Yes, we will invest our energy. 
We’ll forget our professions for a while and invest time in a new organization”.10 
 
 The conclusion for Opp is that East Germany in 1989 was a ‘revolution with no head,’ a 
‘revolution without revolutionaries.’11 The crucial street demonstrations were the products of a 
‘silent coordination of behaviour,’ whereby large numbers of isolated individuals who shared 
similar grievances ‘spontaneously’ made the same rational choice: to demonstrate.12 Conscious 
mobilisation of others did take place, but this, to an overwhelming degree, involved forms of 
‘micro-mobilisation’ in which unorganised individuals persuading friends, family members or 
colleagues to accompany them to Leipzig city centre. It was a ‘spontaneous revolution,’ and if 
New Forum was prominent this was not because ‘it initiated the mass protests but rather the 
converse: the masses got their own movement going and pushed New Forum to the fore.’13 
Opp and his colleagues show convincingly that the civic organisations bore little direct 
responsibility for mobilising individuals to the demonstrations of early October. And there is 
additional evidence in support of their finding. The organisations were in an embryonic 
stage of development in the early autumn, as Detlef Pollack has pointed out. 
 
The leading representatives of New Forum and the other civic groups in Leipzig 
met on 24 September 1989 and agreed to meet next on 22 October—by which time 
the main phases of the upheaval, such as the replacement of Honecker by Krenz, 
had already taken place. This indicates that the civic movement not only did not 
organise the mass protests, but to a considerable extent did not even recognise 
the urgency of the situation.14 
 
Evidence from studies elsewhere in the GDR suggests that these experiences in Leipzig were 
far from unique. One study of the northern town of Schwerin that inquired into the source of 
‘the initial impulse for the first mass demonstration’ on 23 October discovered that, 
 
although the New Forum group organised the event, they did not initiate it. 
Instead pressure from within the factories and workplaces throughout the district 
[...] forced the small New Forum group to act. […] One of their number recalled ‘I 
can still remember how M. came to me and said: “the workers at the 
Plastmaschinenwerk, they’re off, no matter what your group does. The 
demonstration is now to take place on Monday.”’15 
 
Of protest participants whom I interviewed, several recall that in October they were aware of 
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the existence of New Forum but largely ignorant of its goals. Others described their stance 
towards the civic groups as ‘sceptical’. One young Berliner, who described herself as ‘kind of 
Christian,’ 
 
never had a good feeling about New Forum. It seemed so vague, expressing no 
clear position. It gathered together such a disparate bunch of different people 
that it couldn’t give any clear political direction. 
 
In the survey of just over two hundred randomly selected individuals conducted by Lawrence 
McFalls, a large minority of respondents--45 per cent--had taken part in at least one 
demonstration, but only 5.5 per cent belonged to a civic organisation. McFalls concludes, in 
line with Opp et al, that ‘the masses got their own movement going and pushed New Forum to 
the fore’. He illustrates the point with reference to a felicitous metaphor from the questionnaire 
response of one Greifswald demonstrator: ‘The civic groups were like the raisins that happen 
to sit atop a risen bread dough, exclaiming “Look what I have done!”’16 
 But even this image may flatter some of the ‘raisins’. There are grounds for doubting 
whether they all felt pleasure and pride as the dough rose. Those civic movement 
representatives who conceived of their role primarily as a think-tank of reform policies that 
would be implemented, ideally, through negotiation between themselves and the 
government saw the demonstrations as a potential threat. ‘The groups are not seeking to 
accelerate the rapid dynamic by openly supporting or even calling for demonstrations,’ the 
West Berlin tageszeitung reported; ‘the fear of an uncontrolled situation lies deep.’17 Thus, 
when New Forum declared itself to be an umbrella organisation for all critical forces one 
member told western journalists that the move was ‘rather unfortunate’ because it could be 
construed as declaring the organisation to be a political opposition.18 One civic movement 
leader confessed to fearing the ‘force of the population,’ and warned that ‘we may no longer 
be able to restrain the demonstrations.’19 In early October, with the fate of the revolution still 
in the balance, Rainer Eppelmann, a leader of Democratic Awakening, called on citizens to 
stay away from demonstrations.20 Eberhard Seidel, a founder member of New Forum, 
insisted that his organisation had ‘not set out to organise demonstrations and march through 
the cities at the head of thousands of people. New Forum’s aim is to get dialogue underway.’ 
‘Negotiation,’ he added, ‘is the decisive factor, and I believe that will take time.’21 His 
colleague Sebastian Pflugbeil admitted to similar concerns: ‘We look at these demonstrations 
with a very critical eye. They have no form and contours. This worries the security forces and 
we well understand their concerns.’22 
 
 
A spontaneous revolution? 
 
The thesis that the civic groups were the key agents of protest mobilisation is clearly 
mistaken. Yet the alternative advanced by Opp and his colleagues is not immune to criticism 
either. Their case rests upon two pillars of argument, both of which are problematic. The first 
is the assertion that civic movement members ‘did not organize the protests; rather, the 
protests occurred spontaneously.’23 For Leipzig they go further, maintaining that ‘the Monday 
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demonstrations were not organized’ at all.24 The second is that the civic groups did not act as a 
‘reference group’ for the wider population. 
These claims are not baseless. It is well known that part of the magic of the Leipzig 
demonstrations was that they emerged from regular Monday ‘peace prayers’ in the St. 
Nicholas Church, an event which appeared to be ‘unorganised’ or ‘spontaneous,’ and as such 
presented the authorities with an intractable problem. As one Stasi Lieutenant-General 
complained, ‘these “peace prayers” don’t need to be organized any longer; over months they 
have become such a customary gathering for these people that they go there completely 
autonomously.’25 Note, however, those two words: ‘any longer.’ The St. Nicholas Church had 
not ‘spontaneously’ become a meeting place for oppositionists but had been actively created as 
such, by ‘movement organisers’ over the course of the 1980s. Radical pastors, notably 
Christoph Wonneberger and Christian Führer, had stood up to the church authorities, and 
even braved death threats, in order to maintain the St. Nicholas Church as a site at which 
criticism could be voiced.26 Opposition activists had politicised the peace prayers, even when 
pastors Wonneberger and Führer had counselled caution. And when Führer and church 
superintendent Friedrich Magirius had eventually succumbed to pressure to cancel the prayers 
in 1988, oppositionists resisted. Admittedly, it was not opposition activists but emigration 
applicants who, in early 1989, converted the Monday political worships into protests. But they 
had only begun to arrive at the peace prayers in large numbers when they observed that 
oppositionists in Berlin had been expelled from the country as a result of so-called anti-state 
activity. Moreover, it was from within the opposition milieu that the impetus to transform 
emigrant-led protests in support of their exit from the country into demonstrations for political 
change. In short, if one attends to the origins of the Monday demonstrations, it appears that 
organised oppositionists exploiting external resources – the St. Nicholas Church – played a 
crucial role. 
In addition, it should be noted that outside Leipzig the contribution of oppositionists to 
organising the protests of the early autumn was outstanding. One researcher, Carsten Johnson, 
has systematically recorded protest activities in East Germany throughout 1989 and 1990. His 
findings show that the great majority, at least until October, were organised by ‘political 
groups,’ and that only in the last three months of 1990 were the bulk of such events initiated by 
the ‘population.’27 The mass movement, in Leipzig and elsewhere, emerged from a culture of 
peace prayers, church meetings and small demonstrations in the 1980s, all of which were 
strongly influenced, and in many cases instigated by, opposition activists, many of whom went 
on to form the core of the civic movement.28 
 A second shortcoming of the position advanced by Opp et al. concerns the indirect 
relations between civic movement and demonstrators. In their view, the civic movement did 
not act as a ‘reference group’ – a term they use to designate organisations ‘that contributed to 
the development of protest simply by means of their existence.’ Rather, they insist, ‘most 
GDR citizens were unaware of the exact goals and activities of the opposition groups.’ 
Their evidence for this is thin,29 but if the word exact is taken literally, the claim is 
almost irrefutable. What I would take issue with is the ensuing conclusion: that, by virtue of 
their partial ignorance, East Germans ‘could not identify with these groups.’30 Why citizens must 
be cognisant of the exact goals and activities of a group in order to identify with it is not spelt 
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out. Indeed, in a different section of Origins of a Spontaneous Revolution the authors seem to 
appreciate that this is the case. Discussing survey respondents’ attitudes to the Church, they 
find that, despite the ambivalent and at times hostile attitude of Church leaders towards 
opposition and protest, ‘many GDR citizens have probably identified with the goals of the 
Protestant Church because of its somewhat critical stance toward the SED regime.’31 The Church 
was too fractured for any clear, let alone exact, picture of its goals and activities to be drawn, 
and yet Opp et al. nonetheless feel that an unambiguous conclusion is warranted: ‘This 
identification [of East Germans with the Church] promoted participation in the protests.’ 
Compare this with their reluctance to accept that ordinary citizens may have identified with 
the civic movement. Are double standards being applied? It is difficult to conclude 
otherwise. 
 As these examples indicate, identification is a complex and shifting process. 
Identification with an organisation can exist to a significant degree even in the absence of 
comprehensive knowledge of its aims. Citizens can rally to the flag of a social-movement 
organisation even if they are only dimly aware of its agenda. And this, it seems to me, is a 
useful way of conceiving of the relationship between East Germans and the civic movement: 
activists designed and planted the flag; its image was disseminated, by civic movement 
supporters and the West German media; large numbers came to identify with it. Let us turn 
to look at these processes in detail. 
As platforms claiming national scope, the civic groups assembled into a central force 
activists whose primary identification had hitherto been to local church-based groups, as 
well as wider layers with no political experience. From mid-September 1989 they were 
transformed from formal platforms into active forces, in the form of members connected 
through structures. Existing oppositional groups regrouped around civic organisations, and 
spread word of their actions through existing networks. Large meetings in cities attracted 
individuals from surrounding towns, who would return home to set up similar events. Up and 
down the country, oppositionists and their friends got to work gathering signatures and 
printing and distributing leaflets, often at considerable risk. One New Forum organiser 
concealed lists of supporters in an envelope under his pillow—until it became so fat that he 
had to find somewhere else to hide it.32 Uwe Rottluf, a printer in the postal service—who 
found himself ‘in partial agreement with New Forum’—printed out a bale of leaflets at work, 
as a favour for a colleague.33 Next, leaflets were passed on to friends, surreptitiously placed in 
prominent places or handed around at work. Donations were collected to support campaigns 
for detained demonstrators. Activities were also publicised, often with extraordinary success, 
via ‘whisper propaganda.’ One Stasi document from the Potsdam area—representative of 
many from late September and early October—warned that: 
 
Awakening ‘89, as well as calls for support for the ‘Initiative New Forum,’ are 
being distributed by means of the misuse of cultural and other meetings, shop 
windows, wall newspapers, educational establishments and the Church, as well 
as by word of mouth and by the painting of enemy grafitti—all of which proceeds 
without the perpetrators meeting significant resistance. 
 
These acts, the report concluded, have led to ‘large sections of the population developing an 
interest in New Forum’s proposals.’ Their activists, it continued, ‘feel strengthened and 
protected by this “positive” resonance amongst the population.’34 
That the addresses of New Forum’s founder members were published on their 
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materials soon led to their homes attracting thousands of sympathisers – despite the high 
risk of arrest that accompanied such behaviour. On one day alone, Bärbel Bohley’s flat in 
Berlin was visited by 190 people.35 At the home of Berlin New Forum’s Tina Krone, she 
recalls, 
 
queues of people would be waiting on the stairs, every day! They continued into 
the evening, sometimes as late as 2:30 a.m. Some poured out their life stories to 
us; others would say “We want to do X, Y or Z: how did you do it?” 
 
In Leipzig, a New Forum supporter has described how three members each gave their 
addresses as contact points, and when they ‘discovered that we were no longer able to deal 
with the flood [of inquiries]—people would come for information even in the small hours’—
they were obliged to expand the circle of organisers.36 At another, in Magdeburg, in Hans-
Joachim Tschiche’s evocative description, visitors ‘engaged in inflamed discussion; often, 
forty people and more filled all the rooms; cigarette smoke hung in the air; the doors were 
still swinging long after midnight. It was euphoric.’37 
Hives of organisation and debate also formed in churches and church halls. I recall  
visiting one, at the Gethsemane church in Berlin. Outside, a candlelight vigil demanding the 
release of those arrested on demonstrations. Within, several hundred people reading, or 
queuing to read, civic movement propaganda. Whether in churches or in front rooms, these 
sites of organisation and discussion were known as contact centres. They were meeting places 
at which like-minded spirits would gather, helping to create a generalised and actualised 
awareness of common cause. They acted as transformers, raising the voltage of opposition. 
Meanwhile, letters poured in to the contact centres, conveying myriad hopes, concerns, 
demands, or simply greetings.38 ‘What should I do?’ ‘How can I get active?,’ were typical 
questions. One, from a rail worker in Frankfurt an der Oder, read as follows: 
 
As I walked past the main post office I noticed a group of people. A New Forum 
statement was pinned up there! At last I had found what I had been looking for 
for weeks: contact addresses. Please send me information, for my colleagues and 
neighbours have so many questions about New Forum. 
 
Another correspondent wrote to Dr. Tietze of New Forum of his ‘elation’ at hearing news of 
Awakening ‘89. ‘Thank you for your courage!’ was a common phrase. ‘Warmest thanks for 
your leaflet,’ read another; ‘It has filled me once again with a hope that had, I thought, gone 
for good.’ Many other correspondents proposed issues that the opposition might take up, 
some of which were general, others quite specific (in one case even down to the price that a 
loaf of bread should cost—‘Three Marks and fifty Pfennig!’ the correspondent insisted). 
 By means of leafleting, petitioning, the contact centres, and the amplification effect of 
these activities through West German television and radio broadcasts, very large numbers 
did become aware of the existence and aims of the civic groups. A typical experience is that 
of Ollie, an interviewee who described himself as having been ‘not very political,’ and 
mistrustful of organisations—‘I’m the kind of guy who stays quiet most of the time but I turn 
stubborn when challenging something I don’t like.’ Ollie’s memories are of 
 
New Forum leaflets that found their way, somehow, into our apprentice’s hostel. 
Nobody knew where they had come from – but we read them and discussed 
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them. It was all very interesting and so very new. “Wow,” I thought, “What these 
say is actually so logical. Why did I never think of that myself?” 
 
Ollie knew no oppositionists, did not contact New Forum nor attended any of their meetings. 
Yet he clearly did identify with aspects of their aims and analysis and found encouragement in 
the process. The circulation of Awakening ‘89 in particular strengthened the impression 
amongst those who heard of and read it that a movement was crystallising, that demands for 
immediate and real change were now on the table. It acted as a focus for hopes in political 
change and a stimulus to work towards alternative perspectives. It helped to fire tens of 
thousands with a sense of shared purpose, a belief that change was possible, thus raising their 
confidence and commitment to movement building. As one young woman put it, Awakening 
‘89 ‘really was a clarion call. I was electrified.’39 Similarly, a young Berliner, Antje Neubauer, 
recalled, ‘When I heard of New Forum it gave me a greater sense of confidence that things 
would work out—although I still couldn’t imagine that it would ever be legalised.’ 
From the above, it seems that the important question to explore is less that of whether 
or not the civic groups ‘mobilised the populace’ but the character of their activity. Here, a 
useful distinction can be made between agitation and propaganda – or, in Bert Klandermans’ 
terminology, action mobilisation and consensus mobilisation. The former refers to ‘the process 
by which an organization in a social movement calls up people to participate.’40 It includes the 
taking of decisions as to times, places and themes of activities, and the methods used to 
encourage attendance. The latter refers primarily to the dissemination of goals and of general 
arguments as to how these might be achieved. It ‘is a process through which a social 
movement tries to obtain support for its viewpoints.’ Although civic organisation members 
did mobilise for action, there is little doubt that their strongest suit was propaganda. In the 
vocabulary of David Snow and Robert Benford, they propagated a ‘master frame’ that 
helped their audience orient themselves to the unfolding political crisis. 
In social movement theory a frame is ‘an interpretive schema that signifies and 
condenses the “world out there” by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, 
events, experiences and sequences of action in one’s present or past environment.’41 
Collective action frames serve as ‘accenting devices that either underscore and embellish the 
seriousness and injustice of a social condition or redefine as unjust and immoral what was 
previously seen as unfortunate but perhaps tolerable.’42 In addition to offering an 
interpretation of events, they entail diagnostic and prognostic attributions, thereby enabling 
activists ‘to articulate and align a vast array of events and experiences so that they hang 
together in a relatively unified and meaningful fashion.’43 They present political problems as 
being determined or at least largely conditioned by the dynamics of the social order, thereby 
demonstrating the potential for modification through collective action. 
Awakening ‘89 fulfilled several vital framing functions. It presented an interpretation 
of the political impasse in clear and comprehensible language, and it staked New Forum’s 
claim, on behalf of the population, to be ‘part owner’ of the country’s crisis, asserting the 
right to contribute to its resolution.44 By referring to the chasm between ‘state and society’ it 
hinted that chief culpability was the regime’s, and that ‘something should be done’ to 
improve ‘communication,’ construct an open public sphere and pave the way towards a 
more democratic society. The frame of Awakening ‘89 ‘resonated’ widely. It keyed into the 
widespread desires for political change and the demands that the regime begin to listen to, 
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and engage in dialogue with, the citizenry. 
In these ways consensus mobilisation by the civic groups fed into action mobilisation. 
Their forward-looking frame, the pitch that popular pressure could contribute to political 
reform, helped to ferment the belief in wide layers of the population that something could at 
last be done, and that they themselves could play a part. Thousands of individuals now felt 
connected through a shared political and oppositional identity. This process of identification 
with a national platform strengthened the norms of engagement and solidarity that were so 
important in the early, anxious stages of the revolt. The civic movement networks thus 
helped to bring confidence to protestors far beyond their own ranks. Their branches 
mobilised resources, in the form of people, venues, communications, propaganda materials, 
and coordinated activities and information exchange across the country. They fed news to 
the western media, and helped to spark public political debate. In Karsten Timmer’s words, 
the civic movement was indeed a mobilising force: ‘It offered many thousands of people the 
opportunity to get involved constructively, it tapped into the ubiquitous sentiment that 
something must be done.‘45 Although not directly responsible for the mobilisation of the large 
Leipzig crowds of early October the civic movement nonetheless played a major role in 
generating a positive, buoyant culture of protest. 
 One caveat should, however, be added at this stage of the argument. To say that the 
civic movement influenced the wider ‘culture of protest‘ tells us little about the nature of that 
influence. Was it of a transitive kind, with the social movement organisations as agents, the 
broader culture as object? A good part of the literature on framing makes precisely this 
assumption. But as Marc Steinberg has recently proposed the relationship is better conceived 
as ‘dialogical.‘46 In the East German case, the protest culture ‘out there‘ had a powerful 
bearing upon the nature and self-conception of the civic movement. Groups such as New 
Forum evolved in interaction with their supporters and with the wider public. The initial 
self-conception of its founder members was simply as a platform. But as it was adopted by 
protestors as a symbol of opposition this began to change. Of the letters that flooded in to the 
contact centres some referred to New Forum not as a mere ‘platform’ but as a ‘movement’. 
On the streets, protestors appropriated the names and (selected) ideas of the civic movement 
as their own, as a ‘banner’ to wave against the regime; and this, in turn, cemented the 
popularity and repute of the civic groups. The critical moment came when Leipzig 
demonstrators, who had previously chanted ‘We’re staying here!’ as a (courageous but 
directionless) counter-slogan to the emigrants’ ‘We want out!’ began to raise that concrete 
demand, ‘Legalize New Forum!,’ which quickly became one of the most prevalent slogans in 
September and early October, and helped to impart New Forum with a ‘movement identity’ 
of street protest. In such ways, New Forum became a ‘flag’ that indicated an oppositional 
stance. When a group of youths returning home from a disco in Prenzlau stopped to tear 
down some GDR emblems, they were heard to shout ‘Up with New Forum – Stasi out!’47 
Similarly, Andrea, a secretary from Berlin recalls that 
 
My gut reaction to New Forum was positive – even though I knew very little 
about them. I just thought: “they’re oppositionists, they’re against the state, that’s 
good.” So when I went to Leipzig to the demonstration there I chanted “Legalise 
New Forum!” 
 
At the Leipzig demonstrations in late October, by which time some 100,000 had signed 
Awakening ‘89, New Forum, ‘although few in numbers’ was, according to one witness, 
‘thoroughly in charge. Whenever the words “Here Speaks the New Forum” were uttered 
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through the megaphone, the people cheered loudly and gathered round the speaker.’48 A 
month later, a West German polling institute found that over 30 per cent of respondents 
indicated that, if asked to vote, they would cast theirs for one or other civic group, with New 
Forum being the most popular political organisation in the country.49 The conclusion is 
inescapable: the civic movement helped to create an activist, optimistic protest culture. Their 
coming into being represented ‘the signal for an attack on the SED’s power monopoly, and 
with that, the signal for a general uprising.’50 They played a small but significant role in 
dispelling the clouds of resignation and fear that had held back participants from protest. 
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